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1. Video Game Politics
1 Video games are political. It is painful to have to insist on this fact, but the necessity of
such insistence indicates the dimensions of the problem. My nod to Judith Fetterley’s
“On the Politics of Literature,” the introduction to her classic second-wave feminist
study The Resisting Reader, serves not only to contextualize my own modest project in a
much larger tradition of cultural critique but also to indicate that the political aspects
of  video  games  are  still  woefully  neglected  today,  to  the  point  where  their  being
political is all too often denied in the first place. The study of video games and popular
gamer culture is  haunted by the same specters of the apolitical  that Fetterley once
found necessary to exorcise from the study of American literature, and the implications
of that paratactic opening statement are neither trivial nor self-evident.  Instead, as
both journalistic and academic video game criticism are increasingly taking on the task
of exploring what it means to say that video games are political,1 these explorations
meet with strong resistance against the premise itself. Eugen Pfister puts it succinctly
in the opening paragraphs of his commendable essay “‘Keep Your Politics out of My
Games!’” when he states that for such players, the political is “understood as a stain, as
something corrupting the fun.”2 As such, video games are no different from many other
areas  of  popular  culture  whose  exponents  routinely  highlight  their  entertainment
value rather than their functional, political, or ideological role, be it comic books or
football. Like in all those areas of popular and indeed also high culture, these claims to
the exclusive primacy of aesthetics over politics, if not the outright rejection of any
political content or relevance whatsoever, are political themselves in their desire to
construct an apolitical sphere that is not ‘tainted’ by its corrupt opposite.
2 Yet while the political relevance of popular culture in general has been almost a given
in the long discursive tradition of the concept and its academic study,3 the politics of
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video  games  is  still  a  more  fundamentally  contested  territory.  The  borders  of  this
particular magic circle are quite heavily policed by those who believe that a game is
just a game, and that it is and should be separate from the reality in which it is played.
Perhaps the nature of play somewhat lends itself to a stronger insistence on such a
clear-cut  separation  than  other  cultural  forms,  as  it  seems  to  be  the  result  of  an
ontological difference. As Johan Huizinga remarks in his groundbreaking theorization
of play:
All play moves and has its being within a playground marked off beforehand either
materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course. … The arena, the card-
table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis court, the court
of  justice,  etc.,  are  all  in  form  and  function  play-grounds,  i.e.  forbidden  spots,
isolated,  hedged  round,  hallowed,  within  which  special  rules  obtain.  All  are
temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an
act apart. (10)
3 This  ontological  demarcation  can  indeed  be  a  way  of  delineating  the  limits  of  the
political, and if it is not quite a border between the political and the apolitical, then it is
at least a point of transformation where the political changes, where its rules shift, or
where it can be reimagined. Yet this distinction between game and not-game is just as
blurry as that between fiction and nonfiction, and Mia Consalvo’s concise judgment
applies in this case as well: “There is no magic circle.” Nevertheless, Stephanie Boluk
and Patrick LeMieux are right in pointing out that “even if the magic circle does not
exist,  the  desire  for  an  ahistorical,  escapist  gamespace  continues  to  govern  the
standard metagame and the ideological avatar of play” (21). It is still necessary to insist
—and  keep  insisting—that  games  “are  not  isolated  formations,  fundamentally
separated from culture and its dominant ideologies” (Murray 39).
4 Still, the argument that video games are not political must be taken seriously if only
because it cannot be refuted by a simple insistence that everything is political, as such a
universal claim would utterly render the term quite meaningless. At the same time, it is
crucial to make the term meaningful by giving at least a working definition, and one can
hardly  be  explicit  enough  about  this,  given  the  ambiguity  of  the  concept.  Such  a
definition must allow for a distinction between the political and the nonpolitical, which
could then be used to ask first whether there are apolitical spheres of culture, and then
whether or not video games and gamer culture are part of  such a sphere.  My own
approach is more positive, however, as I will describe and analyze a particular aspect of
video  games  that  I  consider  to  be  highly  political,  not  so  much  in  the  interest  of
confirming my opening statement but rather with the goal of  showing at least  one
among many other ways in which this statement is true. Generally, video games are—
like any other cultural  product—both a site of  ideology and of its  contestation,  not
necessarily in a direct sense of conveying an explicit political message as propaganda
but rather in the sense of conveying implicit  and normative assumptions about the
world. In the following, I will consider a concrete example of this by asking whether we
may consider some video games to be populist.
5 In asking this question, I am not using this ambiguous term to denote games that cater
to a mass audience, as this meaning is well covered by the term “popular” rather than
“populist” (although the latter perhaps only describes polemically what is perceived as
an excessive degree of catering to the projected desires of a mass audience, represented
for example by the hierarchical distinction between casual and hardcore gaming).4 The
history of video games certainly exhibits a tendency to make them more accessible and
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popular,  yet  this  is  an  issue  of  consumability5 rather  than  actual  populism  in  the
stricter political sense, and it is interesting mostly for its replication of discourses of
elitism that are usually associated with high culture. What I am concerned with here
instead is how some video games employ a populist imagination in constructing “the
people” while others resist or subvert this populist imagination, and I will argue that
this dialectic is one notable site of the political with regard to the medium (and one
that video game criticism has yet to address at all). I am especially interested in cases
when  this  construction  and  subversion  takes  place  in  the  same  game,  by  way  of
dissonances  between  its  representational  elements—images,  sound,  text,  narrative
aspects—and the gameplay itself; in short, in games that undermine their own populist
aesthetics (thus my title of “ludic populism and its unpopular subversion”). I therefore
understand the political not only as the way power is distributed within a community
or  between  communities  but  also  as  how  such  communities  are  imagined  and
constituted through symbolic practices, and how they are constructed as political units
in the first place, which then may become political actors or sites of political action. If
politics is, as Jacques Rancière has it, “first of all a way of framing, among sensory data,
a specific  sphere of  experience” (10),  the imaginary constitution of  communities as
something to be perceived and experienced is  a central  aspect of  the political.  One
might add that video games resonate particularly well with this political “intertwining
of being, doing, and saying that frames a polemical world” (10) because of their unique
way of combining these three aspects in their medial form.
6 Notably, the imagination of “the people” is one of the most fundamental elements of
modern politics itself, and thus an inquiry into how “the people” are constructed in
cultural artifacts necessarily draws attention to their political aspects.6 An imagination
of “the people” as a political sovereign is indispensable to democratic systems as well
as to totalitarian ones, and in any case this imagination is haunted by the unruliness of
the  concept,  its  productive  and  dangerous  ambiguity,  since  the  term either  means
many different things or designates something that is quite impossible to define in a
concrete sense. Here, I am interested in “the people” especially in the way the concept
is  used  in  contemporary  populist  discourses  in  the  US  and  elsewhere,  namely  to
indicate a homogeneous collective instead of a political actor that is basically a necessary
fiction.7 In  the most  general  sense,  I  claim that  any imagination of  “the people” is
populist, just like any imagination of “the nation” is nationalist, and that both people
and nation are the discursive products of  populism and nationalism instead of their
foundation.8 Yet there are great qualitative differences as to the degrees and forms
these populist imaginations take. Margaret Canovan rightly insists that “‘the people’ as
an entity or group capable of exercising power is/are not readily available. Far from
being  a  given,  it/they  has/have  to  be  in  some  way  constructed,  mobilized  or
represented to be in a position either to wield power or to be checked in doing so”
(88-89).  This is  the case for both an imagination of  “the people” as the democratic
sovereign in purely political terms as much as that of a homogeneous collective whose
coherence is based on an allegedly prediscursive identity. The difference between these
extremes—the fictional political sovereign and the essentialized ethnic community—is
striking,  and  yet  they  find  in  “the  people”  an  imaginary  contact  zone  where  the
conflation  becomes  more  than  conceptual  and  has  very  material  political
consequences.  Indeed,  contemporary  populism is  often  based  on  the  refusal  to  see
these as distinct imaginations at all. It is true that populism is “a particular moralistic
imagination of politics … that sets a morally pure and fully unified—but … ultimately
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fictional—people  against  elites  who  are  deemed  corrupt  or  in  some  way  morally
inferior” (Müller 19-20). Yet I insist that this imagination is not just moralistic but racial
as well,  and that contemporary populism is indeed what can best be described by a
German  term  that  populism  only  pretends  to  reject:  it  is  völkisch,  a  fantasy  of
homogeneity that is exceptionalist, essentialist, racial and racist. This is precisely the
identitarian element that sets such populism apart from an imagination of ‘the people’
as the democratic sovereign that can do without any such aspect.
7 These extremes frame the imagination of  “the people” in any cultural  artifact,  and
these are the terms in which I propose to analyze a set of exemplary video games that
either involve or even need a conceptualization of “the people” as their ludic premise.
Simply put, I want to take a look at how video games imagine “the people,” and to
which ends. This involves a consideration of their aesthetics—how “the people” are
presented as  such—as well  as  of  their  ludic  aspects—the gameplay function of  “the
people.” I will explore whether some video games may be legitimately called “populist”
in the sense that they proffer an imagination of “the people” as a unified collective
“without fundamental internal divisions” (Mudde 68), and I will also explore how other
games (or indeed the same games) instead “pierce the populist fantasy of a fully united,
homogeneous people” (Müller 114). Video games are particularly relevant for such an
analysis of a populist imagination and anti-populist resistance because of their unique
interactivity, so that player agency is always an integral part of their aesthetics and, by
extension, also their politics. Video games not only represent the people in a certain way
but allow or force the player to act toward the people, to act as the people or for the
people (or against them). This agency may support or subvert the ideological “content”
of the representation, especially since agency and power are other crucial elements of
populist discourse.
 
2. Playing with the People: Strategy Games
8 Where do players encounter “the people” in video games, and how do they get to act in
relation to them? Let me first consider the genre that is most explicitly about politics
itself, the strategy game. Any simulation of politics is highly significant in its process of
abstraction, in the ways it necessarily simplifies the complexities of reality in order to
turn it into a system that reacts to player input and provides them with an output that
is,  for  the  sake  of  fun,  neither  predictable  nor  uncomputable.  Processes  of  power
distribution seem to be harder to simulate than others, since the discursive core of
politics  (with  its  very  material  consequences)  is  not  as  easily  broken  down  into
numbers for algorithmic operations.9 This is not so much an issue of mimetic “realism”
but  rather  of  in-game  consistency,  and  the  discursive  aspects  of  politics
(representation, arguments, negotiations, rhetoric, etc.) generally resist the matrix of
cause and effect that allows for effective abstraction in other cases.
9 Perhaps for this reason, many games that seem to be political simulations really turn
out to be something else. For example, one of the first games of the genre, Kaiser (1984),
is an economic simulation rather than a political simulation, and its goal of rising to
political power is achieved mainly by economic means. Other simulations such as the
Sim City series (1989-) focus on the aspect of urban planning rather than urban politics,
and still others (such as Populous [1989], Black & White [2001], or From Dust [2011]) take a
different route and imagine “the people” only from an explicitly godlike perspective.
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All these games are relevant for how they reduce or avoid the political aspects of what
they are simulating, and the politics of this imagination of the apolitical surely would
merit  an  extensive  analysis  of  its  own,  yet  I  can  only  address  them  here  to
contextualize those games that are more complex in their populism. Such simulations
are  notable  in  their  marginalization  of  the  people  as  both  a  political  force  and  a
collective. For example, there are “citizens” in the original Sim City,  and they make
demands and pay taxes, but they are no more than a “population,” and their political
agency is reduced to an opinion poll about whether or not the mayor is doing a good
job. As such, these games may be classified as populist in that they homogenize “the
people,”  yet  since they do this  in order to  marginalize  rather than empower them
within the gameplay framework, their populism is much less prominent and relevant
than  in  games  that  actually  incorporate  “the  people”  as  an  integral  audiovisual,
narrative, and/or ludic element. The aforementioned Civilization series (1991-) is a more
complex example of such populism, as it stands in the tradition of these simulations
that avoid politics but nevertheless makes forays into its sphere in various ways. Its
subgenre of the 4X simulation (explore, expand, exploit, exterminate) is particularly
relevant in this regard, as it usually involves large-scale strategies based on collective
political actors rather than individual ones.
10 As part of this 4X simulation, the Civilization series continually evolved its gameplay
mechanic of diplomacy to simulate the discursive aspects of politics, but this is not the
most salient aspect of how the game imagines and represents politics to its players. The
increasing complexity  of  this  (still  quite  basic)  feature  is  less  relevant  than how it
constructs  political  action  more  generally,  as  it  is  something  that  occurs  between
distinct groups but not so much within them. In other words, players get to negotiate
internationally but not intranationally, and they may dictate internal policies that have
a statistical effect on the population as such, but not on any distinct parts of it. The
basic geopolitical actors in Civilization in terms of its representational and gameplay
aspects are distinct, homogeneous, and transhistorically stable groups of people, and
the game is populist in imagining community that way.10 Players start the game by
choosing a “civilization”—each with slightly different properties, bonuses, or units—
and then guiding it through history to victory, which can be achieved in various ways.
“Civilization” is the most common term the game uses for the groups it constructs, but
it employs related terms such as “nation,” “country,” or “people” as synonyms without
distinction. Consider the American civilization in Civilization V (2010) as an example,
where players are greeted and named as its “leader”:
Welcome President  Washington!  You lead the industrious American civilization!
Formed in the conflagration of revolution in the 18th century, within a hundred
years, the young nation became embroiled in a terrible civil war that nearly tore
the country apart, but it was just a few short years later in the 20th century that the
United States reached the height of its power, emerging triumphant and mighty
from the two terrible wars that destroyed so many other great nations. The United
States is a nation of immigrants, filled with optimism and determination. They lack
only a leader to help them fulfill their promise.
President Washington, can you lead the American people to greatness? Can you
build a civilization that will stand the test of time?
11 The goal, then, is to “lead the American people to greatness,” which means competing
with other peoples to fulfill one of the victory conditions in the game as they progress
from the Ancient era to the Information age (with the expansion Gods & Kings [2012]).
Therefore,  in  Civilization,  human  history  is  the  history  of  different  homogeneous
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peoples, and while they interact in various ways, they never merge. Each civilization
starts  with  a  different  set  of  traits,11 and there  is  no  gameplay  mechanic  to  adopt
another  civilization’s  traits  in  any  way.  Thus  they  remain  both  homogeneous  and
distinct as geopolitical gameplay actors at all times. In this sense, the game offers a
radically ethnopoluralist12 vision that prohibits multiculturalism: there are different
peoples in the world, all of them culturally homogeneous and ethnically distinct, and
they  should  not  mix  in  any  way.  Any  political  or  economic  interaction  happens
between these actors, and the lines between them are as clearly drawn as the borders
on the  game map and their  binary  system of  territoriality,  where  a  tile  cannot  be
shared by two or more powers. The homogeneity of the people is confirmed rather
than disturbed by the way they are represented to players in-game: The social policies
that players implement will grant them gameplay bonuses but not actually affect the
people  except  for  the  very  general  modifier  of  “happiness,”  and  the  people  never
exhibit any significant internal differences over time or at any moment that players
would actually have to consider in their policymaking. Neither elected nor part of the
people themselves, players can rely on the people as a transhistorically stable entity
that never has to be managed in its difference but only as a whole, and even then only
as a resource for other goals. Civilization V thus offers an extreme populist fantasy in
which “the people” are a given but in their stability fully under control, a political tool
rather than itself the subject or object of politics.
12 And yet this is only half the story of Civilization V, and the game itself subverts its own
populism  through  its  gameplay.  This  subversion  can  be  described  in  terms  of  an
unpopular culture that actually stages the people as missing instead of present. This is
an intensification of the absence of the people from earlier games such as Kaiser or Sim
City,  only that now this  absence is  even more palpable because it  is  framed by the
alleged presence and centrality of the people. In other words, Civilization V seems to be
about the people but really is not; it  initially places them center-stage by means of
visual and textual representation but then really plays around them. While the people
appear to be the basic unit of geopolitical action in the game, they are actually entirely
absent from the game itself, and the real actor is their leader, the players, who remain
outside of the in-game time. The only people of consequence in the game are very few
“individuals”—specialists, advisors, functions without names—but never the people as a
group, not even as the most abstract of homogeneous masses, and never as a multitude
of individuals that only barely coheres into the fiction of the people as a political actor.
The people in Civilization V are simply of no consequence; the happiness of “citizens” in
the cities is  an important aspect of the gameplay, but this is  about as much as the
people matter in the game, and they certainly do not matter as a people. Thus the game
subverts its own populist aesthetic by first implying that the people are homogeneous
and timeless and then to render them utterly meaningless in its gameplay. They are
taken out of the political equations rather than complicating them as a variable in the
overall  simulation.  The  implication,  then,  is  that  geopolitical  action  is  not  popular
action, and politics is actually independent of such categories of identity (although its
rhetoric may well  exploit them). After all,  it  does not matter which civilization the
players pick, as they are, fundamentally, all the same, except for the few bonuses here
and there that provide variety but not imbalance, so that the game can be won or lost
with any civilization in any constellation. 
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13 This absence is  even more striking when compared to other simulation games that
include the people more prominently as they construct the political. These games are
notable for their different ways of avoiding the pitfalls of populism in imagining “the
people” as a political entity. Instead of embracing a populist fantasy of homogeneity,
which would certainly be easier to simulate, they pierce it by insisting on diversity so
that  “the  people”  are  not  a  unified  political  actor  but  become  the  heterogeneous
subject  of  politics  itself.  This  is  the  most  effective  strategy  of  the  unpopular  ludic
subversion of populism: show that “the people” are never self-identical and that their
very  heterogeneity  necessitates politics  to  manage  difference  rather  than  express  a
unified will. Such management is the central aspect of the Democracy (2005-) and Tropico
(2001-)  series,  although  the  games  themselves  are  very  different.  The  gameplay  of
Democracy 3 (2015) and Tropico 4  (2011) (and future instalments of both series) is all
about keeping the people happy, and this is a task and goal in the first place because
the people are not a unified whole that can be managed as such. Instead, politics in
these games is geared toward juggling the radically different interests, identities, and
opinions that are subsumed under the governmental fiction of “the people,” and this
diversity indicates just how fictional this unifying term is even on that level. As they
draw on this discrepancy between the fiction of “the people” and a reality of complex
and  heterogeneous  subject  positions,  both  games  employ  a  satirical  mode  of
representation to different degrees, and they thus contain elements of critique of the
very discourses they include in their simulation.
14 This  element is  most  pronounced in Tropico  4,  which is  basically  a  banana republic
simulator that gleefully draws on stereotypical exaggeration in its political satire. The
game casts  players as “El  Presidente” and enables them to build a Cold War island
dictatorship that, in true populist fashion, pretends to be a democracy, even though
every  election  comes  with  a  fraud  option,  along  with  bribery  and  assassination  to
ensure  the  people  are  voting  the  right  way.  Notably,  players  can  even  choose  the
character trait of “populist” for a particular bonus in the game, described as follows:
You have  made  a  meteoric  ascent  into  politics  with  your  ability  to  manipulate
people by exploiting their cravings for change and a better life. You promised to
represent the interests of the common Tropican against the wealthy power elite.
Your rhetoric  is  spiced with full-blown phrases like ‘justice’,  ‘real  reforms’,  and
‘change’—but you’re no different than the next demagogue. Your false promises are
only valid until  you’ve won the elections.  Then you suddenly develop a case of
Alzheimer’s and forget what you’ve said.
Constant  Effects:  +10  respect  with  the  Nationalists,  no  consequences  from
unfulfilled election promises.
15 The  game  satirizes  populism  directly  in  such  descriptions  and  in  the  quotes  that
randomly appear in the loading screens, which often exemplify or comment upon the
anti-elitist, homogenizing rhetoric that is the mark of populist leaders who claim to
represent the true people as a whole while not being part of the elite themselves.13 This
is a textual way of critiquing populist rhetoric by placing it in a ludic context that is all
about  staying in  power  and filling  one’s  Swiss  bank account  along the  way to  any
mission goal the game might offer.
16 Yet the more substantial critique of populism occurs in the gameplay itself, since the
game’s construction of “the people” is based on a complication of “the people.” Like in
Civilization, the players act as the powerful leader, but this time they really need to deal
with “the people” as a political entity, and with the people as a set of individuals rather
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than a singular group. As the players are told during the tutorial  by Generalissimo
Santana,  “[c]itizens  are  the  most  important  and  the  most  dangerous  resources  of
Tropico.” Instead of “the people” being a singular variable in the political equation,
they are a set of variables themselves, and the game conveys this complexity in two
different ways. On the one hand, “the people” are represented by different factions—
capitalist, communist, religious, intellectual, and so on—that each react differently to
player  actions,  and  their  happiness  is  determined  by  a  variety  of  related  factors
(housing, employment, entertainment, etc.). While this is certainly a reductive set of
parameters that curbs the complexity of “the people” in order to simulate it, it is at
least a set of parameters, and they imply that politics means managing “the people” in
their  heterogeneity rather  than  as  a  homogeneous  group.  The  second  aspect  of  this
simulation of diversity is that “the people” are actually people, individuals with names,
age,  gender,  desires,  jobs,  and social  relations who may or may not support one or
many of the factions mention above. As opposed to the 4X genre of Civilization, Tropico’s
city-building simulation allows for granular micromanagement, and the optimization
of economic processes or traffic involves a close consideration of the conditions and
interests of individuals, who may turn criminal, rebel, or leave the island if their needs
are not addressed. Each member of the people is simulated in their differences, and this
resists  the  populist  myth  of  popular  homogeneity.  The  camera  perspective  allows
players to zoom in on the map to watch these individuals as they go about their lives,
and clicking any of them reveals all sorts of information about them, thanks to the
secret police. This ties in with the Orwellian aspects that Tropico explicitly includes in
its  satirical  gameplay,  and  the  info  box  is  also  the  tool  for  players  to  have  these
individuals  bribed,  arrested,  or  assassinated  for  money.  Yet  it  also  emphasizes  the
heterogeneity of “the people” as the subject of politics that is quite capable of political
action but does not exert this power in a unified way as “the people.”14 
17 This heterogeneity is taken a step further in Democracy 3. The game does not wear its
satirical aspects on its sleeve like Tropico 4, but when its take on politics is humorous,
its critique is often directed against populist aspects of it, and it goes even further in its
diversification  of  “the  people.”  For  example,  players  get  to  choose  different  party
names  that  include,  in  a  nod to  Monty  Python,  “The Peoples  Party,”  “The Peoples
Front,”  “The  “Popular  Front,”  and  even  “The  Peoples  Popular  Party.”  The game’s
loading  screen,  which  lists  the  tasks  the  program  is  allegedly  carrying  out  while
preparing  the  game,  includes  items  such  as  “gerrymandering  constituencies,”
“inventing  the  internet,”  “compiling  misleading  statistics,”  “preparing  soundbites,”
“posturing on foreign policy,” “patronizing the electorate,” “pandering to the media,”
or  “scheduling  photo  opportunities.”  The  task  of  the  game is  in  keeping  with  this
satirical beginning, since the game does not really have much of a goal except to stay in
office until  the term limit  without being removed by election or assassination.  The
game  would  therefore  lend  itself  to  simulating  how  populism  as  a  rhetorical  and
political strategy might help the players be as popular as possible with the electorate,
but it  actually includes something that precludes a strategy of pure popularity:  the
people.  Democracy  3  does  not  simulate  populism  but  democratic  politics,  and  the
popularity of the players is tied to the happiness of the people, so that one actually has
to do things to make or keep as many of them satisfied instead of merely promising to
do so. Thus the game actually rejects populism by alluding to its rhetoric and then
dismissing it as an actual political program in a democratic system.
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18 Instead, it tells players on their first election (as American president in this case) that
“there are a number of situations and concerns that you will need to deal with as soon
as possible, while keeping an eye on the long term improvement of our citizen’s quality
of life.” The basic policy screen indicates just how complex a task this is, as it visualizes
a network of  how certain aspects  affect  others  positively  or  negatively  to  differing
degrees, and how a variety of policies are received by which parts of the electorate.
“The people” are fundamental to this system in their capacity as voters, but they are
profoundly  heterogeneous,  and  the  game  ensures  that  the  term  refers  to  a  loose
political collective rather than a unified identity. In fact, the voters are different from
each other along so many lines that players may initially wonder how to keep anyone
happy  at  all,  and  the  gameplay  accordingly  revolves  around  managing  difference
rather than creating unity. There are twenty “voter types” that are used in the polls,
including  categories  such  as  “retired,”  “patriot,”  “motorist,”  or  “parent”  that  may
overlap  with  most  other  categories.  Furthermore,  voters  are  placed on a  spectrum
rather than in binary terms, so that usually a person is neither socialist nor capitalist
but, say, sixty percent socialist. As these categories intersect in various ways, the game
offers a rather complex representation of the individual voter (or potential nonvoter),
and their numbers add up to an electorate that is just as complex. This double diversity
resists the homogenization of “the people” as anything more than the collective term
for  a  radically  heterogeneous  group.  Instead  of  supposing  that  “the  people”  are  a
singular political actor or are united by categories of identity, this stages the tension
between Rousseau’s volonté particulière and volonté générale, between the individual and
general will. Mistaking any part of the people for all the people is a definite way of
getting assassinated, and the game does not allow for populist politics as a winning
strategy in its democratic system, so that its gameplay and its mode of representation
both can be considered as ways of piercing the populist fantasy of homogeneity.
 
3. Playing with the People: First-Person/Third-Person
Shooters
19 Even if political or quasi-political simulation games may be the genre that lends itself
most to populism and its critique, this dialectic may potentially be present in any other
genre, although it will literally play out differently in each case. In the last part of my
analysis, I want to take a look at first-person and third-person shooters, probably the
most  popular  genre  of  the  twenty-first  century,  and  one  in  which  gameplay,
representation,  and  narrative  intersect  in  more  complex  ways  than  in  others.  The
genre has certainly become more narrative in its single-player modes, but at the same
time the freedom of increasingly open-world exploration has heightened the agency of
the players, so that plot and action are potentially set at odds with each other. This is
precisely the fault line that is most important to a consideration of ludic populism and
its potential subversion in such games.
20 That conflict is very subdued in my first example, BioShock Infinite (2013), as it limits
player agency for a more stringent narrative experience, and it is not an open-world
shooter like my second and third examples, Just Cause 3 (2015) and  Far Cry 4  (2014).
BioShock Infinite does contain a noteworthy critique of populism, but it is a narrative
rather than ludic critique, and as such it is less effective in subverting the fantasy of a
coherent people, since players are not required to position themselves interactively
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within this dialectic of construction and subversion. Instead, they are confronted with
populism as a plot element rather than a ludic element in the form of the Vox Populi,
the  group whose  militant  resistance  against  the  oppressive,  racist,  and xenophobic
regime of the Founders in Columbia seems not only just but also initially in line with
Booker  DeWitt’s  (and  the  players’)  agenda.  Led  by  Daisy  Fitzroy,  the  self-declared
“voice of the people” opposes the elite of Comstock and his privileged few, uniting
those who are marginalized due to their ethnicity or class. This effectively pits one
populist  narrative  against  another,  as  both  the  Vox  and  the  Founders  base  their
political ideologies on notions of “the people,” only that they radically differ as to who
constitutes them (or should): the Vox think of “the people” in terms of “the common
people” versus an elite that exploits and disenfranchises them, while the Founders’
notion of  peoplehood is  a  mainly  racial  one based in  nineteenth-century American
white privilege. In their respective ways, both are making “the core claim of populism:
only some of the people are really the people” (Müller 21). The game narrative sets up
Comstock as an enemy and the Vox as allies, but it subverts this binary by making the
players not a champion of the people, as one might expect given how this trope informs
many a video game. Instead, the game’s multiverse shifts to a timeline where Booker
already  was  this  champion  as  Fitzroy’s  martyred  lieutenant,  and  players  get  to
experience  the  disastrous  results  of  this  reality,  in  which the  armed Vox fight  the
Founders in a brutal civil war. There is a possibility that the Vox encountered at first
may have turned out differently in their timeline, but the actualized reality reveals
them to be just as cynical and power-hungry as the Founders they oppose. They kill
civilians  in  the  name  of  the  people,  and  Fitzroy,  symbolically  covered  in  blood,  is
prepared  to  murder  the  young  son  of  industrialist  Jeremiah  Fink  for  the  sake  of
“pulling up the weeds from the root,” as she has it.15 Her populism is thus revealed to
be as fraudulent as that of the Founders, despite their different foundations, and the
game subverts both their fantasies of “the people” as a unified political actor rising up
against the elite that oppress them and as a racial identity using said exclusion to exert
power over those it deems inferior outsiders. The game also subverts the trope of the
players liberating an oppressed people that is often used to great effect in order to
frame and direct player agency in video games, for example in Homefront (2011) or Far
Cry 3 (2012). It does so by subverting the notion that there are “the people” to begin
with,  and  it  implies  instead  that  they  are  as  much  a  rhetorical  device  of  the
revolutionaries as of those in power. BioShock Infinite does not devalue its own critique
of racism and oppression that it proffers through the representation of the Founders
and their identity politics, but it certainly contextualizes it further to imply that there
is no neat binary opposition between the people and an elite in the different worlds of
the game.
21 Yet  this  contextualization  does  not  really  involve  the  players,  and  their  agency  is
framed so narrowly that they do not get to deliberately position themselves within and
toward these complexities of clashing populisms. This is where truly open-world games
make for more interesting material, as their representation of such populist political
struggles clashes more openly with the ability of players to interact with the game
world that is narrated in these terms. Just Cause 3 and Far Cry 4 are exemplary in this
regard, and my argument is that both these games use their gameplay to deflate the
populism that informs their representational aspect.  As in Tropico or Democracy,  the
element of humor is also not to be disregarded here, since both games take themselves
and their subject matter much less seriously than BioShock Infinite, and this allows for a
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more effective satirical mode that goes against the grain of the usual dead seriousness
of  populist  fantasies.  This  is  most  pronounced  in  Just  Cause  3,  which  features
protagonist Rico Rodriguez as a “dictator removal specialist” whose overall strategy is
to cause so much chaos that the regime is sufficiently destabilized, which in a very
concrete sense means blowing up anything that is conveniently marked as belonging to
the regime.16 In the third installment, Rico gets to liberate his home of Medici, a group
of Mediterranean islands oppressed by General Di Ravello. His aim, as revealed in a
cutscene after the second story mission “Time For An Upgrade” in conversation with
his sidekick Mario Frigo, is to “show the people we can take back their cities and towns
for  them,”  to  which Mario  responds:  “Whatever  you do,  we’ve  got  your  back—and
whatever you destroy,  we’ll  rebuild.” Rico’s strategy is  surely questionable in many
ways, but most importantly it sets him up as the symbolic representative of the people
acting in their stead for their own good. This is the representational logic of populism,
which cannot exist “without someone speaking in the name of the people as a whole”
(Müller 20). As revolutionaries, Mario and Rico presume to do just that as they engage
in “a particular  moralistic  imagination of  politics,  a  way of  perceiving the political
world that sets a morally pure and fully unified—but … ultimately fictional—people
against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some way morally inferior” (Müller 19-20).
This populism constructs the fiction of the people in order to rebel against an actually
oppressive government, but their justified revolutionary claims do not make them any
less populist in their means.17 The civilians in the game offer soundbites that confirm
this populist scheme of representing the people and taking action for them, affirming
that this is a just cause by saying “Rico, bless you and all you have done for us. Run the
general off our island and give Medici back to the people!” or “Rico, you’ve inspired us
to take back our country. Viva la revolution!” The game thus implicates players in the
populist imagination and represents it as accurate, since “the people” actually talk to
Rico and affirm his claim to enact their will. Mario’s words offer the validation of Rico’s
campaign by adding the people as the constructive component that works in harmony
with, rather than opposition to, his destructive actions: “whatever you destroy, we’ll
rebuild”  in  a  complementary  movement  of  the  people  and  their  heroic  male
personification.
22 A comparable imagination of “the people” is included in Far Cry 4,  with the marked
difference that its protagonist is no CIA-sponsored dictator removal specialist but an
American  tourist,  Ajay  Ghale,  who  gets  violently  entangled  in  the  politics  of  the
Himalayan country of Kyrat as he visits to return his mother’s ashes to their homeland.
The opening cutscene frames Ajay’s entry into Kyrat in terms of his dual identity that
relates to notions of peoplehood and belonging that will become more prominent in the
game:  an  American  embassy  official  addresses  him on  the  phone  as  “Mr.  Ghale”—
pronounced  [ˈgeɪl]—and  tells  him  he  can  only  process  his  visa  application  as  an
American  citizen,  since  they  have  “no  official  records  regarding  [his]  Kyrati
citizenship.” Darpan, the fellow passenger on the bus who is helping Ajay enter Kyrat,
demands his passport, which Ajay hands over for him to insert a bribe, adding Kyrati
money to the American document and thus symbolically blending the two aspects of
Ajay’s identity. At the border, the inspection results in a firefight between the Golden
Path rebels on the bus and the soldiers at the checkpoint, with the eventual arrival of
Pagan Min, the autocratic ruler of Kyrat. Min addresses the protagonist as Ajay Ghale—
pronounced  [ˈga:leɪ]—which  recontextualizes  his  identity  as  Kyrati  rather  than
American.  This  duality  is  relevant  when  Ajay  enters  the  political  turmoil  of  the
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rebellion and encounters the Golden Path as the populist revolutionary force that rises
up against Min’s decadent dictatorship, as it justifies Ajay’s role as someone who acts
for the people of Kyrat because he is one of them. This is a part of his identity he
uncovers as the game progresses and has him side with the Golden Path in various
missions, and like Rico, Ajay becomes an all-powerful champion of the people and the
central active force in their liberation. The initial cutscene frames this agency in terms
of  identity  rather  than  political  representation,  and  it  invites  players  to  read
peoplehood in ethnic  terms rather than in purely political  ones.  In populist  terms,
players act for a unified but oppressed people against a corrupt elite, in this case a one-
man  elite  of  Pagan  Min,  and  their  individual  actions  are  justified  in  the
representational logic of populism that also informs the revolutionary efforts they join.
23 However, this is only half the story, and both Just Cause 3 and Far Cry 4 significantly and
substantially  subvert  their  respective  populisms  to  such  an  extent  that  they  may
ultimately  be  interpreted  as  works  that  challenge  rather  than  espouse  a  populist
imagination of homogeneous peoplehood. In Far Cry 4, this occurs in representational
terms as the Golden Path is disenchanted like the Vox Populi in BioShock Infinite in the
end, and the populist rhetoric of the two leaders Amita and Sabal is revealed to be as
harmful as anything they sought to resist. After completing the game, players get to see
the effects of their actions as they sided with either of the two in their battle against
each other, and none of the outcomes is morally positive in explicit reference to the
concept of peoplehood. In keeping with the populist notion that only some people are
really “the people,” Sabal has Amita’s soldiers executed while telling them: “You chose
to fight your own people— When you sided with Amita, you chose to desecrate your
own heritage and spit on the gods.” He tells Ajay that “there must be a cleansing for us
to move forward” and thus shows how directly the populist rhetoric of “the people” is
connected to  ethnic  notions of  identity  that  delineate  the pure people.  In  contrast,
Amita  is  shown  ordering  soldiers  to  round  up  all  the  children  as  she  is,  as  Ajay
poignantly observes, “forcing the people to join the Golden Path,” and she justifies this
by telling him that she is “sacrificing our liberties for peace later. You can either get in
line or get out of the way.” Both Amita and Sabal illustrate the material consequences
of  the  normative  construction  of  the  unified  people,  and  their  actions  imply  that
imagining a homogeneous people is  not far from homogenizing the people through
violence and “cleansing” them from any “impurities.”
24 Yet  this  representational  critique of  the populist  imagination is  not  even the most
significant  one,  and  both  Just  Cause  3 and  Far  Cry  4 mount  an  even more  effective
challenge through their gameplay. This is implicit in the former and explicit in the
latter, as Pagan Min thoroughly dismisses any populist motivation in the players by
telling them what truly fuels their actions in the game, and this applies to Ajay as much
as Rico. The narrative elements of populism that have players fighting for the people
against a corrupt elite are directly countered by the open-world gameplay that is based
on individualism rather than political ideology. The high degree of agency granted to
players opposes rather than supports the populist cause they allegedly support. Pagan
Min  tells  Ajay  at  the  end  about  his  motivations,  and  his  account  has  profound
significance for an interpretation of the gameplay experience: “Yes, your father killed
your half sister, and then your mother killed him in return. I simply continued where
she left off. I’ve killed so many people for them. But then I realized, I was only using
Lakshmana’s death as an excuse to do whatever I wanted to do. Just as you use those
ashes as  an excuse to do whatever you want to do.  God damn if  it  isn’t  fun.” This
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dismisses any moralistic motivation of the players in their gameplay actions, and it
indicates that these narrative elements—the populism as much as the motivating plot
device  of  the  ashes—are  irrelevant  to  an  open-world  game that  allows  and  invites
players to do whatever they want to do, and have fun as they do it. Players may or may
not care about the troubling populism of the Golden Path or the plight of the Kyrati
people, but regardless of their attitude, neither of these aspects truly informs the game
to  such  an  extent  that  they  really  affect  the  gameplay  experience.  Instead,  this
experience  is  determined  by  a  heroic  individualism  that  enables  players  to  act
according to their wishes, and the cutscenes that diminish this agency are less central
to the game than the open-world interaction that heightens it. Pagan Min points out
that this is about power rather than any narrative justification, about doing whatever
you want to do. In the intro cutscene, Min tells Ajay that “You and I are gonna tear shit
up,” and in the alternative ending that comes after the player has actually waited for
Min after being asked to in the opening scene, Min tells him that “maybe now we can
finally shoot some goddamn guns.” Both these lines indicate the true motivation for
the gameplay, and they reveal any narrative content as supplementary. This applies to
Just Cause 3 as well, only that the subversion of narrative by gameplay is hinted at in the
title: Rico’s just cause is reinscribed as a short version of “just because,” which is a
more  apt  description  of  the  players’  motivation  in  the  game.  Rather  than  truly
engaging  with  the  populist  revolutionary  struggle,  players  are  causing  havoc  just
because  they  can,  and  the  open-world  exploration  provides them  with  means  of
interaction that either really need no narrative justification or are even in contrast to
it. Like Far Cry 4, Just Cause 3 is about “tearing shit up” and shooting some guns in a
heavily  stylized,  over-the-top sandbox designed mainly  for  this  purpose,  and these
gameplay  elements  are  so  thoroughly  disconnected  from  the  populist  narrative
framing that they subvert rather than affirm it. Instead of fighting for the people, then,
we are fighting for ourselves, and this more than anything shows just how empty the
rhetoric of populism is when confronted with the true motivation of our interaction
with the game: God damn if it isn’t fun.
 
4. Conclusion: Playing against the People
25 In summary, then, the video games considered here seem to be populist only to subvert
said populism, and they do not stop at constructing “the people” without moving on to
dismantling it  again.  They do so  by  either  revealing this  arbitrary  constructedness
itself or a complexity that goes against the grain of the simplification that is at the
heart of populist rhetoric. In a way, video games parallel these simplifying aspects of
populism in that they are better at ludic complexity than at narrative complexity, and
they lend themselves to representations of “the people” that are as reductive as those
offered  by  populists.  However,  the  games  I  analyzed  here  counteract  their  own
tendency  toward abstraction  in  at  least  two  ways:  First,  they  use  satire  and
exaggeration for their critique on a representational level, and second, they use the
complexity  of  their  gameplay  to  oppose  their  own representational  simplifications.
Thus, they offer a ludic critique of populism and enlist the players and their agency in
it, and in doing so, they self-reflexively draw on their own narrative limitations rather
than deny them. This, then, is one way in which the video games discussed above are
political: In their various ways, they present their players with an imagination of “the
people” and then force them to engage with this construction so that they will not act
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as  or  for the  people  but  rather  in  such  a  way  that  fantasies  of  the  unified  and
homogeneous people are dismantled because the players are playing. The controlled
individualist aspect at the heart of this fantasy of agency surely merits a critique of its
own, and it is no less political than the populist aspect it undermines. Yet this must not
detract from just how effective such a fantasy is at doing so. After all, populism is such
a serious business that both humor and playfulness should not be underestimated as
ways of putting it out of that very business.
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NOTES
1. Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter’s Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games
(2009)  is  an  important  milestone  in  this  development.  More  recent  notable  book-length
publications in this regard include Soraya Murray’s On Video Games:  The Visual  Politics  of  Race,
Gender and Space (2017) as well as Gaming Representation: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in Video Games,
edited by Jennifer Malkowski and TreaAndrea Russworm (2017).
2. Pfister’s discussion in many ways provides the conceptual ground for my particular analysis
here.
3. See for example Nieguth as well as Street, Inthorn, and Scott for recent studies on the politics
of popular culture.
4. Jesper Juul usefully complicates this all too neat binary in his study A Casual Revolution.
5. Cher Krause Knight uses the term populist in such a positive, anti-elitist way when describing
public art in terms of “the extension of emotional and intellectual, as well as physical, accessibility to the
audience” (x).
6. Similarly, such an inquiry highlights the role of aesthetics for such political formations, as
Jason Frank’s  Constituent  Moments:  Enacting  the  People  in  Postrevolutionary  America convincingly
demonstrates with regard to US American literature.
7. One might describe, in contrast, the imagination of a homogeneous people as an unnecessary
fiction.
8. Ernesto Laclau asserts as much in stating that “populist discourse does not simply express
some kind of original popular identity; it actually constitutes the latter” (163).
9. We notice this difficulty especially when it obviously fails. The most glaring example is the
famous case of Gandhi in the early Civilization series, whose base aggression value is 1 to cast him
as the ultimate pacifist, yet the slightest reduction in this numeric value due to diplomatic events
(such as the player adopting democracy) would lead the game to misinterpret this negative value
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as  the  highest  positive  one,  effectively  turning  Gandhi  into  a  hyperaggressive  nuclear
warmonger.
10. This structure also corresponds to a more generally Western conception of geopolitics that
underlies Civilization as a whole, as Dan Ford shows in his convincing postcolonial critique of the
game.
11. For  example,  the  Americans  may  build  the  unique  units  of  the  B17  bomber  and  the
Minuteman, and their starting bonus is called ‘manifest destiny’ and grants all land military units
+1 sight and gives a 50% discount when purchasing tiles.
12. ‘Ethnopluralism’  is  anything  but  pluralistic.  The  term  adopts  and  mocks  a  progressive
vocabulary but disguises a racist ideology based on the notion that there are ‘pure’ cultures and
ethnicities that each have their territory and should stay there to prevent their corruption.
13. For example: “‘I am not a liberator. Liberators do not exist. The people liberate themselves.’
Che Guevara” or “‘I am the Jesus Christ of politics. I am a patient victim, I sacrifice myself for
everyone.’ Silvio Berlusconi.”
14. Bertrand Lucat and Mads Haahr rightly argue that, in Tropico 4, the gameplay usually does not
require  attention  to  this  level  of  detail,  so  that  “the  determining  factor  of  the  ideological
narrative of play is the need to keep even these dehumanized masses happy, regardless of their
specific proclivities” (10). Yet this does not invalidate the argument that these people do exist as
individuals, even if they are rarely perceived as such, since the game thus highlights how their
individuality  is  actually  negated  in  the  process  of  constructing  them as ‘the  people’  for  the
dictator’s own purposes.
15. Tyler DeHaven and Chris Hendrickson accordingly read the Vox Populi in Marxist terms as a
revolutionary group who ends up as oppressive as those they replace. Stefan Schubert rightly
observes that there is no gameplay difference in fighting either of the two, which drives home
the point of their parallels on a ludic level on top of the narrative one.
16. The title evokes the US invasion of Panama in 1989-90 under the code name “Operation Just
Cause.”
17. Notably, the exiled politician Rosa Manuela is introduced in the intro as “populist leader” and
not  “popular  leader,”  which  indicates  a  certain  self-reflexive  consideration  of  this  populist
imagination.
ABSTRACTS
The  commendable  critical  tendency  to  increasingly  consider  the  politics  of  video  games  in
general is routinely met with resistance on the part of those who insist on their apolitical nature,
in  parallel  to  other  areas  of  popular  culture.  In  this  contested  discourse,  it  is  all  the  more
important to be specific about what it actually means to claim that video games are political, and
this essay offers one particular way in which to address this issue. Understanding the political as
a way of imagining a community as a political actor through symbolic practices, either in the
interest of creating the sovereign of democratic systems or an ethnicity, I argue that video games
may employ a  populist  imagination in  constructing ‘the  people’  as  a  basically  unified group
(usually in implicitly or explicitly essentialist ways) as much as they may resist or subvert this
populist fantasy of homogeneity. I am especially interested in games that dialectically combine
both  these  aspects  at  the  same  time  by  way  of  dissonances  between  their  representational
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elements  and  their  gameplay.  Focusing  on  strategy  games  and  action  games,  my  examples
include Civilization V, Democracy 3, Tropico 4, BioShock Infinite, Just Cause 3, and Far Cry 4.
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